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DEFINING AUDITORS' RESPONSIBILITIES 
Abstract: This paper explores the efforts of the audit 
profession to dominate definitions of their roles and 
responsibilities throughout the last two decades. The 
paper considers alternative definitions of these roles and 
responsibilities as forwarded by others and the 
justifications and defenses provided by auditors to 
legitimize their conceptions of these matters. 
The U.S. auditing profession maintains that its work enhances the 
reliability and credibility of financial statements and thereby facilitates 
the operation of capital markets. Although the profession has 
benefitted greatly from legislated requirements for annual audits, it 
has also fought forcefully to dominate the definitions of its tasks, 
roles, and responsibilities—to perform audits as it sees fit. In 
developing and maintaining a particular position relative to their 
responsibilities in conducting financial audits, auditors have attempted 
to tell the public whom they serve as well as the types of tasks that 
the public may reasonably expect the profession to undertake. 
This insistence upon a self-definition of tasks, roles and 
responsibilities should not be surprising. With the passage of the 
securities acts and licensing statutes by individual states, auditors 
have demarcated the attestation of financial statements as an element 
of their professional jurisdiction. Through such demarcations, 
professions attempt to gain legitimate control over particular kinds of 
work [Abbott, 1988]. They claim the right to perform work within 
their jurisdiction as they deem appropriate and also to dominate 
public definitions of their professional tasks. In effect, professions 
are asking the public to trust that they know best how to define their 
professional roles and responsibilities and how to accomplish their 
professional tasks. Carmen Blough [1939, p. 165] succinctly captured 
this position in discussing why auditors should refer to audit 
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procedures "deemed" appropriate rather than exhaustively listing the 
procedures performed during an audit in the audit certificate (i.e. 
report): 
[These words] say 'You must trust me to do a good job as an 
accountant. No detailed recital that I might make of the 
auditing procedures followed would tell you enough to make 
it worth your while to read them. If you cannot trust me, 
you had best not depend upon my certificate, but if you can 
bring yourself to the frame of mind where you believe I will 
do what an honest, capable and independent public accountant 
should do, then you may rely upon it.' 
In exchange for defining its professional work and 
responsibilities, however, a profession must also be seen to perform 
the work defined as contained in its jurisdiction. In other words, an 
obligation is imposed upon a profession to do what it says it will do. 
For some professions, this obligation is perhaps difficult to monitor. 
For example, do lawyers actually serve the needs of justice, their 
primary jurisdictional claim [Abbott, 1988].1 For other professions 
such as auditing and accounting, "failures" to accomplish professional 
work may be highly visible and the definition of a "failure" contested. 
Audits are seen to fail. Indeed, the history of auditing might be 
interpreted by some as a history of auditing failures [Power, 1992]. But 
when is an audit to be described as a failure, and when do such failures 
suggest weaknesses in auditing practices or failures by the auditing 
profession more generally? Are sudden and unexpected corporate 
bankruptcies evidence of an audit failure? What of the failure to detect 
material fraud? When may audits described as failed be interpreted to 
imply the roles and responsibilities of auditors should be redefined? The 
answers to these questions no doubt depend upon to whom they are 
addressed. 
The significances or meanings to be attached to an audit opinion, the 
only visible sign that audit work has been performed, remain ambiguous. 
Does a "clean" report imply that fraud was absent or that no fraud was 
detected? Can one infer from a "clean" report that a corporation is 
financially sound and can be expected to continue its operations into the 
future? Or does a "clean" report refer only to the use of GAAP in 
constructing financial statements? Each (or all) of these meanings may 
be and have been assigned to the "clean" audit report. Yet, they carry 
1This claim is also being increasingly contested in recent years. 2
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significantly different implications for the roles and responsibilities of the 
auditor. If a "clean" report is interpreted to mean no fraud is present, 
then the auditor has a responsibility to detect fraud, to search actively to 
find it. If it implies only that no fraud was detected, then the auditor may 
not be seen as responsible for searching for fraud. If the report is 
interpreted to imply that a company will continue to exist, then the 
auditor must assess its future viability before issuing a report. 
In recent decades, considerable attention has been given to the 
existence of an "expectations gap" between what "the public" believes 
auditors should do and how auditors have defined their roles and 
responsibilities. Disagreement and controversy have surrounded the 
significance and content to be accorded the term "auditors"roles and 
responsibilities". This gap has been explored in the accounting 
literature. For example, Humphrey et al. [1992] have critically 
examined the response of the profession to this gap, primarily in the UK 
context. Hooks [1991] has considered efforts to match public concerns 
with auditor actions, and suggested that the profession may benefit from 
public ignorance. These and other authors have raised questions 
regarding whether auditors act in the public interest when they adhere to 
extant standards rather than assess the economic consequences of audited 
transactions [Merino & Kenny, 1994; Martins & McEnroe, 1992]; when 
they respond to public outcries in particular ways [Fogarty, 1996; 
Byington & Sutton, 1991; Mills & Bettner, 1992] or even whether they 
meet their own definitions of serving the public interest [Sikka et al., 
1989]. In this paper, I hope to make a modest contribution to this 
literature by examining the efforts of the U.S. accounting profession to 
dominate definitions of its roles and responsibilities during the last three 
decades. These efforts have occurred amidst tension between the 
perceived obligations of auditors to perform particular tasks and their 
declared "rights" to define such tasks. In part, this tension has arisen 
from the particular cultural values [Abbott, 1988] with which auditors 
have aligned their work. The next section briefly considers some of these 
values in an historical context and the justifications employed by 
auditors to legitimize their work. It also outlines the ways that auditors 
defined their professional tasks during the 1970s. In the subsequent 
sections, I consider the challenges that have been posed to these 
definitions and the responses of auditors to these challenges, from the 
1970s to the 1990s. The final section contains some concluding 
observations. 
3
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WHY ARE FINANCIAL AUDITS "VALUABLE"? 
In the 1970s, auditors described their role as one of enhancing the 
credibility of financial information and furthering the operations of an 
effective capital market [Carmichael, 1974]. This claim bears a striking 
resemblance to those made in the 1930s regarding the necessity for 
enhanced financial disclosure by corporations. Prior to the 1930s, 
corporations were required neither to submit annual reports to 
government agencies or shareholders nor to have such reports audited. 
Corporate managers "regarded their company's affairs as private and 
privileged" [McCraw, 1984, p. 166].2 Indeed, "Mystery [i.e. 
nonreporting] was treated as an asset, on the grounds that publicity 
would be too informing to competitors" [Ripley, 1927, pp. 178-179]. 
During the economic depression, corporate secrecy was increasingly seen 
as a threat to the functioning of capitalism undermining the legitimacy 
of the securities industry [McCraw, 1984]. For some, the "worst 
damage" of the Depression was the "wholesale betrayal of confidence by 
investors" [Andrews, 1932, p. 354], including "unrestrained financial 
exploitations which create[d] fictitious values never justified by 
earnings" [Roosevelt, 1933, p. 226]. 
Regaining investor confidence was deemed essential to the economic 
recovery of the U.S. [Roosevelt, 1933], and enhanced disclosure by 
corporations was seen as one means to this end. It was in this climate of 
economic depression and distrust that the 1933 Securities Act ("Truth 
in Securities") was enacted. The act was described as a response to "the 
reticence of financiers" [Rep. Rayburn, quoted in McCraw, 1984, p. 
166], and required that specific disclosures accompany the issuance of 
new securities. The 1934 Securities and Exchange Act extended these 
disclosure requirements to encompass all publicly traded companies and 
established the Securities and Exchange Commission. The New Deal 
legislation also required that the disclosures and reports submitted by 
corporations be audited. These audits would enable a new era of "caveat 
vendor" [Andrews, 1932, p. 359], supplanting that of caveat emptor 
which had been prevalent in previous decades. After all, "it is generally 
regarded that an independent audit of any business is a good thing" [Col. 
Carter during Congressional hearings on the Securities Act, quoted in 
Carey, 1960, p. 187]. Through enhanced disclosure, audit, and other 
practices, confidence and trust were to be restored in the operations of 
2Also see Ripley [1927] and Robbins [1929]. 4
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 24 [1997], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss2/3
Young: Defining Auditors' Responsibilities 29 
the securities markets.3 The practice of auditing was thus closely linked 
to the cultural value of credible financial reporting seen as necessary for 
the securities markets. 
In the 1970s, audits were still described as affirming the truthfulness 
of financial statements and ensuring that financial statements were 
"fairly presented" [Palmer in New York Times, April 6, 1975]. This 
function was loosely linked to various audit practices including the 
review and testing of company records and the procedures and controls 
used to assemble financial information, approval of the use of various 
accounting principles, and examination of financial statements to ensure 
they contained no material misstatements, omissions, or misleading 
presentations of data [Silverman, 1971]. Through the application of 
such practices, the auditor was to render a professional opinion "as to 
the reliability of a company's financial records. . . judged in terms of the 
adequacy of records from which the information emanates and the 
acceptability of technical accounting principles involved in recording 
transactions" [Silverman, 1971]. In describing their role in this way, 
auditors maintained that the purpose of an audit was to ensure that 
financial statements fairly presented the financial position and condition 
of a business entity and that the notion, "fairly presented", was a 
function of the acceptability of various accounting principles. The audit 
profession did not accept responsibility for the preparation of financial 
statements. Instead, these statements were declared to be the 
representations of management and the responsibility of management 
[Mautz and Sharaf, 1961].4 
The terms used to describe the auditors' role were quite 
ambiguous—ensuring "fair presentation" and the "truthfulness" of 
financial reporting. While such ambiguity serves to suggest the expertise 
and knowledge required to conduct an audit properly through the 
exercise of professional judgment [Power, 1992], it also increases the 
possibility of multiple and conflicting interpretations of these terms as 
well as multiple and conflicting assessments as to whether auditors had 
accomplished these ends in specific instances. What obligations did the 
profession maintain were undertaken by auditors? Could financial 
statements be described as "fairly presented" when an auditor failed to 
3See Neu [1991a, b] re: trust production in the Canadian securities industry. 
4This statement echoes an opinion of the SEC which maintained that the 
"fundamental and primary responsibility for the accuracy of information filed with 
the Commission rests upon management" [quoted in Montgomery, 1940, p. 13]. 5
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detect fraud? With fraud, revenues and assets might be overstated or 
expenses and liabilities understated. If information about these 
accounting categories could be said to represent the financial condition 
and operations of an entity but the categories themselves were 
"inaccurate," then could one argue that the financial statements fairly 
presented the operating results and financial condition of the entity? Did 
the term "fairly present" which appeared in the standard audit opinion 
imply that financial statements were free of material errors resulting 
from fraud or other illegal acts? 
Prior to the passage of the securities acts, the primary purpose of an 
audit was to "ascertain the actual financial condition and earnings of an 
enterprise," with the minor object of detecting and preventing fraud and 
errors [Montgomery, 1921-22, pp. 19, 21, and 1927, pp. 23, 25]. 
However, by 1940, the detection of fraud was no longer described as an 
object of the audit, as this would "require an examination of such detail 
that its cost... would be prohibitive" [Montgomery, 1940, p. 13].5 By 
the late 1940s, it was argued that audits were not designed to detect 
fraud, nor were auditors responsible for its detection [Montgomery, 
1949; Kohler, 1947]. 
Throughout the 1970s, auditors continued to maintain that the 
concept of "fairly present" as defined by the profession imposed a very 
limited obligation upon auditors to detect fraud or other illegal acts. 
Some argued that it was "sheer ignorance to think the purpose of the 
audit is to detect fraud" and, in their engagement letters with corporate 
management, audit firms often included explicit statements to indicate 
they were not in the business of detecting fraud [Hershman, 1974; Blinn, 
1977]. According to the professional literature of the time, auditors were 
responsible for detecting fraud only when such detection could occur 
through the application of generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) 
[Holdren, 1969; Carmichael, 1975; Kapnick, 1976]. Yet, GAAS was 
seen to guide the conduct of "ordinary" audit examinations—those in 
which fraud was not thought to occur. Indeed, audits were assumed to 
be performed in a corporate environment of honesty and integrity 
[Solomon and Muller, 1977] and auditors were not required to presume 
that fraud had occurred while conducting an audit [Kapnick, 1976]. As 
a consequence, the application of GAAS could not be "relied upon to 
assure the discovery of either defalcations and similar irregularities or 
deliberate management misrepresentations" [Carmichael, 1975, p. 79]. 
5Through such arguments, auditors were also aligning their work with notions 
of efficiency. 6
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From this perspective, if auditors properly applied GAAS in an 
engagement but failed to detect fraud, then no audit failure had occurred 
even though the financial statements might contain errors. The audit 
profession thus limited its definition of an audit failure to include only 
those cases in which an auditor failed to apply GAAS. In doing so, it 
maintained that auditor performance and their roles and responsibilities 
were to be assessed only by reference to the rules and guidelines 
established by the profession. Auditors were to be evaluated on their 
own terms rather than by reference to the roles and responsibilities that 
nonauditors might believe should guide the conduct of an audit. 
In defining an audit failure as a failure to follow GAAS, the 
profession was promoting and claiming its right to establish definitions 
of "fairly present" and to perform its work as it saw fit [Abbott, 1988]. 
Even as it continued to call upon broader cultural values such as the 
credibility of financial statements to justify and legitimate the usefulness 
of an audit, the profession also attempted to control and define the terms 
used to assess whether these values had been achieved. In this way, and 
through these definitions, the audit profession was attempting to 
construct and define the "proper" roles and responsibilities of auditors. 
Furthermore, with its limited definition of an audit failure, the profession 
was apparently attempting to equate the performance of an audit in 
accordance with GAAS as sufficient evidence that the cultural value of 
credible financial statements had been achieved [Abbott, 1988]. If 
audited, financial statements were to be seen as credible. The profession 
was attempting to preclude public discussions of the meanings and 
significances to be assigned to the audit and, instead, sought to define 
those terms seen to provide the audit process with value in ways desired 
by the profession, and thereby to control the significance of work 
performed within its jurisdiction. 
QUESTIONING THE DEFINITIONS PROVIDED BY 
AUDITORS—1970s 
Although the profession forwarded its desired definition of an audit 
failure and thereby of a "quality" audit, the revelation of scandals such 
as Westec, Yale Express, and Bar-Chris [Why Accountants, Business 
Week, 1971] as well as National Student Marketing [Wall Street 
Journal, October 29, 1974], Beverly Hills Bancorp [Wall Street 
Journal, August 14, 1974], and Equity Funding [Wall Street Journal, 
January 8, 1975; January 10, 1975; December 18, 1975] raised 
questions about the propriety of the auditing profession's definitions, 
7
Young: Defining auditor's responsibilities
Published by eGrove, 1997
32 The Accounting Historians Journal, December 1997 
including questions about its roles and responsibilities in detecting fraud. 
Some commentators suggested that if audits could fail to detect a fraud 
of the magnitude of Equity Funding, then as currently conducted they 
might have little value [Wall Street Journal, July 12, 1974; Hershman, 
1974]. The Equity Funding scandal was seen to place intense pressure 
upon auditors to accept a duty to detect fraud [Wall Street Journal, 
January 8, 1975]. 
Members of the SEC also criticized the profession's position on 
fraud. Some commissioners considered auditors in a strategic position 
to "nip fraud before it blossoms" and criticized them for failing to heed 
"red flags" that were indicative of potential fraud [Wall Street Journal, 
July 12, 1974]. In referring to several major cases of substantial 
management fraud, one SEC commissioner commented: 
In most of these cases, the fraud was one which was designed 
to present a misleading picture of results through transactions 
with related parties or through outright fictitious 
transactions... If the accounting profession adopts the view that 
auditors should never be responsible for detecting management 
fraud, there is little likelihood that increased imposition of the 
truly onerous and unfair burdens on the accounting profession 
can be prevented. Standards can best be promulgated by the 
profession and can serve to allay fears that auditors will become 
insurers against all forms of management fraud, however 
carefully concealed [News Report, Journal of Accountancy, 
1973a, pp. 14,16]. 
He urged the profession to accept responsibility for fraud detection [New 
York Times, October 17, 1973] as did the Commission more generally: 
"We believe that in examinations for corporations whose securities are 
held by the public, accountants can be expected to detect gross 
overstatements of assets and profits, whether resulting from fraud or 
otherwise" [quoted in Hershman, 1974, p. 53]. 
In addition to concerns about auditor responsibilities to detect 
material errors, auditors were criticized for a perceived failure to 
maintain their independence from their corporate clients [It's Time to 
Call, Fortune, 1970; Why Accountants, Business Week, 1971]. These 
questions were particularly troubling as they suggested that auditors had 
failed to meet their own definitions of a "quality" audit. Did auditors 
serve their corporate clients or act in the public interest by protecting 
investors and creditors [The Big Bath, Newsweek, 1970; Why 
8
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Accountants, Business Week, 1971; New York Times, November 5, 
1973]? Were auditors "too friendly" with management and should they 
continued to be hired as employees by their former clients [New York 
Times, November 18, 1972]? Had heightened competition within the 
profession resulted in an increasing unwillingness by auditors to insist on 
"compliance" with financial accounting standards and to "pursue 
incompetence" [Letter to the Editor, New York Times, December 7, 
1975]? Was a "more muscular audit" needed to alleviate pressures on 
auditors to provide creative accounting answers for clients who 
otherwise threatened to change auditors [New York Times, April 14, 
1974]?6 
Although accounting writers indicated an awareness of criticisms 
that auditors were not adequately independent of corporate clients, that 
accounting results disclosed too little, and that financial statements were 
too complex [e.g., Seidler, 1973], the general response of the profession 
to these criticisms can be summarized in a single phrase: "You just don't 
understand." Even as auditors continued to argue that audits enhanced 
the credibility of financial information, they also claimed that audits were 
not designed to detect fraud. While auditors insisted they could enhance 
the credibility of financial reporting without actively searching for fraud, 
the public appeared to disagree with this position and apparently 
expected that significant or material fraud would be detected by an 
audit.7 In contrast to the definition of an audit failure forwarded by the 
profession, the public defined such failures as including those audits 
6 Apparently, the Securities Acts were not as effective in allowing 
auditors to escape the "grip" of management as was originally hoped 
[McCraw, 1984], nor were the rules on independence sufficient to achieve 
this end despite an awareness by the profession of the need for public 
confidence in the "unbiased and selfless character of the public accountant's 
role" [Miranti, 1990, pp. 176-177]. 
7For example, a 1974 Arthur Andersen & Co. survey "indicated that 66% 
of the investing public believe[d] that the most important function of the 
public accounting firm's audit of a corporation is to detect fraud" [cited in 
AICPA, 1978, p. 31]. Further, Baron et al. [1977] reported survey results in 
which nonauditors indicated higher levels of auditor responsibility for the 
detection of deliberate material falsifications than did auditors. With the 
exception of auditors, the survey respondents also indicated a preference for 
extending auditor responsibilities with respect to the detection of deliberate 
material falsifications of financial statements. 
9
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which did not detect material fraud or errors. This difference in 
definition called into question the propriety of the practices both followed 
and defined by auditors in conducting audits. The controversy 
surrounding Equity Funding and other corporate failures as well as 
questions about the independence of auditors suggested that the 
profession had not succeeded in equating the performance of an audit in 
accordance with GAAS as sufficient evidence that credible financial 
reporting had been produced. These corporate failures highlighted 
differences between the ways in which the auditing profession linked the 
audit to credible financial reporting and how the public interpreted this 
linkage. 
The profession interpreted these criticisms as indicative of a failure 
by the public to understand the roles and responsibilities which it had 
defined. The public was described as misinformed about the services 
customarily performed by CPAs [Solomon et al., 1976, p. 68]. These 
differences between public interpretations and auditor interpretations of 
how an audit was to intersect with the production of credible financial 
statements were construed by auditors as indicative of a need to educate 
the public. A properly educated public would accept that audits could 
enhance the credibility of financial statements without serving as 
guarantees of the accuracy of financial statements [Hershman, 1974]. 
In emphasizing the necessity for educating the public, the profession 
attempted to avoid reassessing its own definitions of its roles and 
responsibilities. Instead, confronted with these differences and 
interpretations, the audit profession renewed its efforts to dominate the 
signficances to be assigned to its roles and responsibilities and to 
persuade the public to accept the value of an audit as defined by 
auditors. In particular, the profession sought to manage impressions, 
emphasized better communication by auditors, called upon other cultural 
values to justify its position, and outlined expertise and its limits. 
Managing Impressions. Through various means, the AICPA 
attempted to manage public impressions about the roles and 
responsibilities of the audit profession. In 1973, the AICPA Board of 
Directors announced the formation of a special committee "to study 
whether the auditing standards, which are currently considered 
appropriate and sufficient in the examination of financial statements [by 
the AICPA], should be changed in the light of Equity Funding and to 
report its conclusions to the Board of Directors and the auditing 
standards executive committee" [News Report, Journal of Accountancy, 
1973b, p. 14]. The Institute justified forming the committee by 
indicating that "the Institute shares the general public concern about the 
10
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Equity Funding disaster, which caused enormous losses to investors and 
creditors apparently by reason of massive and collusive fraud" [News 
Report, Journal of Accountancy, 1973b, p. 14]. Although some 
individuals claimed that no lessons could be learned from such a poorly 
conducted audit engagement, others suggested that the fraud was 
possible because Equity Funding employees had exploited blind spots 
and crevices in existing audit practices [Wall Street Journal, January 8, 
1975; Tipgos, 1977]. 
This AICPA special committee later concluded that the Equity 
Funding fraud could have been detected using existing auditing standards 
and that the professional position with respect to its responsibility to 
detect fraud was sound [Wall Street Journal, June 5, 1975; Olsen, 
1982]. For the committee, the Equity Funding scandal was not 
interpreted as evidence of the profession's failure to perform appropriate 
tasks but rather as a failure by individual auditors to follow established 
rules and guidelines. Even so, the committee urged that the standards 
relating to fraud detection be restated in more positive terms to avoid 
public misunderstandings of the audit and to reemphasize that audits 
might detect fraud but were not specifically designed to do so [Olsen, 
1982]. The committee in this way reasserted the position of the 
profession with respect to fraud detection and maintained that the audit 
purposes as previously articulated were sound. The problem confronting 
the profession was thus seen as one of educating the public about the 
proper role of the auditor rather than a reconsideration of this role. 
Audits were not designed to detect fraud, and the public was to accept 
the profession's definitions of its roles and responsibilities. 
This emphasis upon interpreting public criticisms as the public's 
failure to understand the auditor's role can also be seen in the 1974 
formation of the Cohen Commission on auditor's responsibilities.8 This 
commission was charged with "determining] whether a gap exists 
between what the public expects of auditors and what auditors can 
reasonably be expected to accomplish [News Report, Journal of 
Accountancy, 1974, p. 14]. The wording of this announcement 
suggested the results the AICPA anticipated the Commission would find: 
the public's expectations of auditors were unreasonable and auditors had 
appropriately defined their tasks. As part of its efforts at impression 
management, the AICPA later pointed to the formation of the Cohen 
8The Commission was to explore mechanisms for developing auditing 
standards, possible alterations to the standard audit report, and whether 
auditors should monitor all financial information released to the public. 11
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Commission as evidence that it was taking the steps necessary to police 
itself: "We're going to show that accountants are concerned about the 
consumer" [New York Times, May 9, 1976]. Apparently, the formation 
of the Commission rather than any changes resulting from its possible 
recommendations was to be seen as sufficient evidence of auditor 
concerns about discrepancies between public and auditor interpretations 
of how to define auditor tasks and responsibilities. 
Emphasizing Better Communication. Again, criticisms of auditors 
were interpreted as the public's failure to understand properly the role of 
the auditor. However, this failure was now explicitly attributed to faulty 
communications between the auditor and the public. At times, this faulty 
communication was blamed upon the media for misleading the public: 
and if the public has cast the accountant in the role of the 
nemesis of all those who would embezzle funds, falsify financial 
statements or commit other corporate crimes, it is not altogether 
at fault. Some of the recent publicity in connection with 
lawsuits involving prominent accounting firms appears to lend 
considerable credence to the idea that the auditor is, in the final 
analysis, the conscience of business, big and small. In reality, 
this is a popular misconception [Silverman, 1971, p. 80]. 
At other times, faulty communication was attributed to the existing audit 
opinion. In 1969, Roth [p. 61] argued that 
A better understanding of the independent auditor's role by the 
users of our reports and by the public generally might go far 
toward reducing the number of cases taken to court and 
resultant unfortunate legal decisions. One means of attaining 
better understanding could possibly be a clearer explanation of 
the scope and purpose of our audit in our short-form report. 
Rosenfield and Lorenson [1974] also blamed the ambiguous audit report 
for the turmoil over auditor responsibilities. In particular, they faulted 
the statement made within this standard report that claimed financial 
statements were presented fairly in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting principles. They recognized that this statement could be 
subject to a number of different interpretations, each of which implied 
differing responsibilities for auditors. 
The failure of the public to understand was in part a consequence of 
poor communication by auditors. As such, the solution to then current 
12
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controversies surrounding the audit profession was to consider 
"improving" the audit report so as to describe better the profession's 
conception of an audit's purpose. However, this purpose was still to be 
defined by the profession. Apparently, "improved communication" was 
to be a monologue in which the public would be told by the profession 
what it could "reasonably" expect from an audit. In calling for altered 
audit reports, there was a presumption that the existing practices, roles, 
and responsibilities of auditors were appropriate. The public was to 
accept that the audit profession knew best how to enhance the credibility 
of financial information. 
Calling Upon Other Cultural Values. Other authors attempted to 
justify more directly the position of the profession with respect to the 
discovery of fraud. They attempted to convince the public (or perhaps 
only Congress and the SEC) that its interpretations of the role of an audit 
were unreasonable and inappropriate. Some pointed to the confusion 
regarding the definition of fraud and noted that many business failures 
arose from other factors such as bad management or adverse economic 
conditions [Catlett, 1975]. They also argued that requiring auditors to 
accept responsibility for fraud detection would interfere with American 
cultural values of "free" enterprise and "opportunity for all" [Catlett, 
1975; Cooney, 1995]. By imposing such requirements on auditors, they 
would be reluctant to accept more risky companies as clients. As a 
result, these companies (often start-ups) would be unable to obtain audit 
services and would thereby be effectively denied access to capital 
markets. Following this chain of reasoning, free enterprise, and 
consequently competition within industries, would be hampered if 
auditors were required to accept fraud detection as one of their 
responsibilities. Stated in other words, the "traditional" responsibilities 
of auditors as currently defined served to promote greater economic 
opportunities for all.9 
It was also argued that requiring auditors to accept this 
9Interestingly, some individuals attempted to employ the weight of 
"tradition" as a reason to maintain the status quo. They claimed that fraud 
detection conflicted with the "traditional" audit approach and was, in general, 
too costly an undertaking [e.g., New York Times, April 6, 1975]. However, 
these arguments represented an effort to construct such a tradition. The 
Cohen Commission later traced the steady erosion of fraud detection as an 
audit objective [AICPA, 1978, pp. 33-35]. See Hobsbawn and Ranger [1984] 
on the construction of traditions. 
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responsibility would sacrifice another cultural value—efficiency [Abbott, 
1988]. Relative to the large number of audits conducted each year, the 
incidence of undetected fraud (an audit failure as defined by the public) 
was claimed to be small (a claim perhaps impossible to either refute or 
substantiate). Requiring auditors to search actively for fraud would 
result in the performance of additional audit procedures. But if one 
assumed that undetected fraud was a relatively infrequent event, then 
obviously such additional efforts would not be cost-effective [Hershman, 
1974], but rather a waste of auditor time and client money.10 
Outlining Expertise and Its Limits. Again, auditors maintained 
that the public failed to understand the particular expertise of auditors. 
Some expressed the opinion that an adequate answer to the question of 
what "good" is an audit that could not provide assurance that material 
fraud was detected "is exceedingly involved and probably beyond the 
grasp of the average user of the auditor's work" [Carmichael, 1979], the 
"non-expert." Others questioned the ability of such non-experts to 
understand the "esoteric, highly specialized professional standards and 
responsibilities" of the auditor [Solomon et al., 1976]. In effect, because 
the public was not expert in auditing, the nature and extent of the 
complex tasks underpinning the audit report were best left to those 
specifically trained in undertaking these tasks. In making these 
arguments, Solomon et al. [1976] criticized the actions of the trial judge 
in the Continental Vending case who had instructed the jury that "proof 
of compliance with GAAP [generally accepted accounting principles] is 
evidence which may be very persuasive but not necessarily conclusive 
that [the auditor] acted in good faith, and that the facts as certified were 
not materially false or misleading." The judge's instructions were to be 
seen as inappropriate because the professional expertise and judgment 
of the audit profession was being effectively supplanted by that of a less 
informed and knowledgeable jury. Instead, for these authors, the jury 
should have been instructed that compliance with generally accepted 
accounting principles would be sufficient to acquit the auditors. In 
forwarding these arguments, the authors suggested that the audit should 
be considered an end in itself and that the means to this end were best left 
to the experts, the audit profession. In deciding whether an audit had 
resulted in the production of reliable financial reports, one need look no 
further than assessing whether the statements were prepared in 
accordance with the established accounting rules and auditing standards. 
10This argument echoes that made by Montgomery [1940] to explain why 
fraud detection was not an audit purpose. 14
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Even as some maintained that the expertise of auditors lay beyond 
the understanding of the general public, others argued that this expertise 
also had its limits. Now, auditors were argued to possess no special 
powers in detecting fraud. They were not favored with hindsight and 
conducted audits under a presumption of honest management [New York 
Times, April 6, 1975]. As such, the audit profession could not and 
should not undertake responsibilities it could not successfully fulfill 
[Catlett, 1975].11 Such justifications for the status quo presumed a 
certain fixity in the nature of an audit engagement and a self-assurance 
as regards its continuing relevance in the face of efforts to exclude 
nonauditors from any role in defining its nature and purpose. These 
justifications also suggested an extraordinary confidence in the 
continuing importance of the audit profession and its self-defined tasks. 
In issuing revised auditing standards on fraud and illegal acts in the 
late 1970s, the profession attempted to maintain the status quo. The 
fraud standard repeated previous professional statements about the 
limitations of the existing audit process, limitations that might allow 
errors to remain undetected. As such, it was seen to do little more than 
to reiterate "traditional" audit doctrine and to emphasize that frauds do 
occur [Wall Street Journal, May 6, 1976] and might remain undetected. 
Similarly, the proposal on illegal acts explicitly recognized the expertise 
limitations of auditors and indicated that auditors could not be expected 
to provide legal opinions. Again, this new requirement was seen to have 
little effect upon existing auditor responsibilities [Wall Street Journal, 
January 31, 1977]. 
The articles appearing in the accounting practitioner journals and 
elsewhere during this period seemed to emphasize the necessity for 
making the public understand the auditor's roles and responsibilities as 
interpreted by auditors. This understanding was to be imposed upon the 
public by the profession. Although auditors claimed to act in the public 
interest, they also maintained that as "experts" they were best qualified 
to decide their responsibilities. They argued that the profession was best 
situated to decide what constituted reasonable public expectations with 
11This lack of expertise/professional competence argument was also used 
to justify resistance to placing upon auditors a responsibility for the detection 
of illegal payments [New York Times, September 28, 1976]. Many illegal acts 
were seen as far removed from entity's financial affairs (the area of audit 
expertise). As such, it was unlikely that an auditor could detect them during 
the audit engagement (e.g., violations of OSHA or EPA regulations) [Solomon 
and Muller, 1977]. 15
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regards to audit performance and auditor roles and responsibilities. 
Auditors were to define these tasks both for themselves and the public; 
they were to control the activities within their professional jurisdiction 
and to decide whether the credibility of financial statements was being 
enhanced by their activities. 
CHANGING THE TERMS OF DEBATE 
In 1976, a highly critical Senate staff study was released about the 
accounting profession [U.S. Senate, 1976]. This study claimed that the 
professional interests of auditors were too closely intertwined with those 
of large corporate clients, attacked auditor claims of independence and 
questioned the reliability of private audits [New York Times, January 23, 
1977]. In a cover letter, Senator Metcalf stated that the Big Eight 
accounting firms had shown "an alarming lack of independence and lack 
of dedication to public protection" [New York Times, January 17, 1977]. 
The study suggested that governmental regulation of auditors might be 
necessary, including the establishment of federal auditing standards 
[Wall Street Journal, January 17, 1977]. It also questioned the 
appropriateness of the existing process for establishing accounting 
standards [U.S. Senate, 1976]. Initially, the AICPA expressed dismay 
at the Senate staff's 
unwarranted conclusions. This effort [of the AICPA over 35 
years] combined with actions of SEC results in achieving the 
highest quality of financial reporting and disclosure of any 
country in the world [Wall Street Journal, January 17, 1977]. 
Partners from Big Eight firms were reported as describing the staff study 
as both wrong and superficial [New York Times, January 17, 1977]. 
Despite these assertions, several auditors who later testified during the 
Congressional hearings about the study urged Congress to allow the 
auditing profession time to reform itself. 
With the publication of this report and the convening of subsequent 
Congressional hearings, attention appeared to shift away from questions 
about the appropriate roles and responsibilities of auditors and towards 
an emphasis upon finding specific practices that could serve as symbols 
suggestive of the appearance of auditor independence. The threat of an 
increased federal role in the operations of the auditing profession appears 
to have been a critical element in this shift. The "new" practices 
installed during this period included the formation of audit committees, 
16
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 24 [1997], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss2/3
Young: Defining Auditors' Responsibilities 41 
disclosures of disagreements between auditors and corporate clients, and 
the implementation of mechanisms to discipline and control the actions 
of auditors, such as peer review. In emphasizing the development and 
implementation of these practices, questions that had earlier been raised 
about the proper roles and responsibilities of auditors faded into the 
background. This shift was quite significant in that it allowed the 
auditing profession to continue forwarding its preferred meanings for an 
audit and its definitions of the appropriate roles and responsibilities for 
auditors. With this shift, attention was redirected from the 
interpretations to be accorded an audit to focus instead upon the sorts of 
services an audit firm could be permitted to provide and still claim its 
independence from clients and the types of disciplinary techniques 
needed to convince nonauditors that professional self-regulation was 
possible and workable.12 
This shift from a consideration of roles and responsibilities to 
finding and installing specific practices of self-regulation occurred in 
spite of the publication of the tentative and final conclusions of the 
Cohen Commission. In its tentative conclusions, this Commission 
suggested that the expectations gap often described by auditors as 
unreasonable was apparently ". . . caused by the failure of auditors to 
fully assume responsibilities they are capable of assuming, rather than 
by unreasonable user expectations" [Seidler, 1977, p. 20]. The Cohen 
Commission recommended that auditors be required to provide a broader 
range of information about corporate clients and to expose publicly the 
wrongdoing of clients in certain circumstances. It further recommended 
that the auditors clarify their responsibility for fraud detection. In 
making this recommendation, the Commission commented that the users 
of financial statements "should have the right to assume that audited 
financial information is not unreliable because of fraud and that 
management maintains appropriate controls to safeguard assets" 
[AICPA, 1977, p. 36]. In other words, credible financial reporting could 
not be produced if auditors failed to detect material fraud. 
These recommendations suggested that public interpretations of the 
significance of the audit and auditors' responsibilities of should 
supersede some definitions forwarded by the profession. While the 
profession was to decide how these different tasks would be 
implemented, the Commission explicitly accepted a role for the "public" 
in defining the responsibilities of auditors. In this way, its 
recommendations might have been seen to threaten the dominant role of 
12See Fogarty [1996] on peer review. 17
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the profession in defining its own roles and responsibilities. 
Unsurprisingly, its recommendations tended to be ignored by the 
AICPA.13 
INTEREST RENEWED 
As the 1980s began, Congressional interest in accounting and 
auditing matters subsided. In 1981, the New York Times commented: 
Pressure for Federal regulation has waned. The Securities and 
Exchange Commission has shredded its letters warning of the 
importance of auditor independence from the companies they 
audit. And, perhaps most surprising, certified public 
accountants now occupy powerful positions in Washington 
[New York Times, October 7, 1981]. 
In this same article, an AICPA representative was quoted: 
For the first time in years, the accounting profession is 
experiencing real power in Washington not just outside 
influence. 
Even as regulatory interest in accounting waned, articles continued to 
appear in the press (although with less frequency than earlier) that were 
critical of auditing and accounting. The media continued to report on the 
ways in which "slick" accounting ploys were used to improve the 
reported income of companies [Wall Street Journal, June 20, 1980], on 
the rise of accounting "scams" accepted by auditors without qualification 
[Wall Street Journal, July 9, 1982], about SEC charges that financial 
statement "fudging" was a growing practice [Wall Street Journal, June 
2, 1983; "The SEC Turns Up the Heat," Business Week, 1984] and on 
the increasing number of corporations that fired auditors who had issued 
13Indeed, the AICPA was accused of responding superficially to these 
recommendations by studying the report intensively in small committees 
while failing to heed its advice [Seidler, 1979]. For example, the AICPA 
announced the formation of a committee to study the tentative conclusions of 
the Cohen Commission in 1977. This announcement also suggested the 
importance of the Commission for public relations purposes: "This is the type 
of independent study that would benefit any profession which is accountable 
to the public" [News Report, Journal of Accountancy, 1977, pp. 16, 18]. 
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qualified audit opinions [Wall Street Journal, May 12, 1983]. 
As the prohibitions on advertising and client solicitation were either 
dropped or substantially reduced, competition within the auditing 
industry (often taking the form of price competition) increased 
dramatically and auditing firms entered into the "alien world of 
marketing" [Wall Street Journal, March 18, 1981]. Accounting firms 
were now characterized as ever more aggressively "courting competitors' 
clients, promising lower audit fees" [New York Times, October 3, 1984] 
and squeezing profit margins on the traditional auditing business of the 
large accounting firms [New York Times, December 30, 1984]. In this 
environment, concerns were raised about "whether growing competitive 
pressures [might] be encouraging auditors to bend the rules in favor of 
clients, such as keeping a questionable loan on the books to keep up the 
bank's profits on paper" [New York Times, March, 10, 1985]. Questions 
were also raised as to whether audits had become "loss leaders used 
merely to win more profitable management and tax-consulting contracts 
with the client" [New York Times, February 18, 1985]. These questions 
suggested that auditors were failing to carry out the roles and 
responsibilities which they had defined for themselves. They implied or 
stated outright that auditors and audits were not enhancing the credibility 
of financial statements in at least some instances. 
Such questions arose amidst a number of significant "audit failures" 
occurring relatively soon after an entity had received an unqualified audit 
opinion ["Auditing the Auditors," Business Week, 1983]. In 1982, Penn 
Square Bank collapsed three and one-half months after receiving an 
unqualified audit opinion [Wall Street Journal, July 29, 1982]. 
Although the auditors had warned Penn Square directors that the bank's 
financial problems were growing, they issued an unqualified audit 
opinion because of perceived risks to depositor confidence [Wall Street 
Journal, August 17, 1982]. Similarly, three weeks before the FDIC 
declared United American Bank insolvent, its audit firm issued an 
unqualified audit opinion on the bank's financial statements even though 
many federal investigators had been present during the audit [Wall Street 
Journal, March 4, 1983]. In 1984, the New York Times listed several 
instances of alleged audit failures including Litton Industries, Security 
America Corporation, Drysdale Government Securities Corporation, 
Saxon Industries, Flight Transportation, Alpex Computer, United 
American Bank, Penn Square Bank, and Datapoint [New York Times, 
May 13, 1984]. Later, the New York Times [November 23, 1984] 
reported several lawsuits pending against a single international 
accounting firm arising from audit work at DeLorean Motor Company, 
19
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Nucorp Energy, Seafirst National Bank, Frigitemp, the Reserve 
Insurance Co., and the Financial Corporation of America. Between 1980 
and early 1985, the largest accounting firms paid more than $ 175 million 
in settlements and judgments over disputed audits [McComas, 1986]. 
Despite earlier efforts to convince the public that the profession had 
no responsibility to detect fraud, the significant number of instances 
designated as "audit failures" again raised questions regarding the 
significances that could be accorded to an unqualified or "clean" audit 
opinion. For example, the New York Times [May 13, 1984] commented 
that auditors are thought of as 
the watchdogs who will detect fraud or emerging financial 
problems before those problems sink a bank or make a 
corporation's stock price plunge. 
But such faith has been eroded lately through a series of 
incidents in which some of the most elite accounting firms have 
blessed a financial statements on the eve of disaster. 
Were auditors fulfilling this responsibility? Did the audit enhance the 
credibility of financial reports? 
In 1985, Congressional attention again focused upon the auditing 
profession and hearings were held about the role of auditors. Before 
these hearings began, Rep. Dingell, the Committee chair, indicated his 
concerns about "whether accounting is giving us a fair and accurate and 
truthful picture of what is going on in the industry" [New York Times, 
February 18, 1985]. His committee intended to raise questions regarding 
whether competitive pressures and MAS services were eroding the 
independence of auditors [New York Times, February 18, 1985] and why 
auditors had not provided advance warning of the deteriorating financial 
condition of banks and other companies [Wall Street Journal, February 
12, 1985; February 19, 1985]. 
In opening the hearings, Dingell referred to a U.S. Supreme Court 
description of the auditor's role: 
By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a 
corporation's financial status, the independent auditor assumes 
a public responsibility transcending any employment 
relationship with the client....This public watchdog function 
demands that the accountant maintain total independence from 
the client at all times and requires complete fidelity to the public 
trust [quoted in Miller, 1986, pp. 28-29]. 
20
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The media also reported charges by the Dingell committee that the 
existing regulatory framework had not been effective in 
providing a warning system that might have prevented a series 
of financial disasters in the last few years—including the run on 
Continental Illinois National Bank, and the collapse of Penn 
Square Bank and Drysdale Government Securities. In each 
case, auditors gave the company's financial statements a clean 
opinion shortly before disaster struck [New York Times, March 
7, 1985].14 
Given these concerns, the Dingell committee investigated the role of 
accounting firms in "blessing" those accounting practices that were 
perceived to mask the financial condition of several savings and loan 
entities that later failed. Comments in the press indicated that the 
committee believed self-regulation was flawed: ". . . the same people 
write the (financial accounting) rules, interpret the rules . . . [sic] and 
enforce the rules" [Wall Street Journal, March 7, 1985]. Dingell 
commented: 
The present self-regulatory system permits the accounting firms 
to control the setting of audit standards, to apply those 
standards to individual clients, and to sit in judgment of 
themselves when an audit failure occurs. All of this is done in 
private [quoted in Miller, 1986, p. 32]. 
The many alleged audit failures raised renewed concerns about the 
independence and objectivity of auditors in the high-pressure competitive 
environment in which accounting firms also offered consulting services 
[Dingell, 1985; Wall Street Journal, September 20, 1985]. During the 
hearings, Dingell highlighted these concerns by referring to a newspaper 
advertisement that ended by saying "In fact, there's only one thing wrong 
with calling ourselves Deloitte Haskins & Sells & You. The You really 
should come first." He commented: "That doesn't sound too 
independent to me" [New York Times, March 10, 1985]. The terms 
employed in the previous paragraphs to describe the perceived problems 
with auditing are quite telling—a public watchdog function, an early 
warning system, "inappropriate" clean bills of health, "blessing" of 
misleading financial accounting practices, and concerns about the 
14Also see New York Times [March 10, 1985]. 21
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"independence" of auditors. Admittedly, some of these terms might be 
seen as high-flown rhetoric by a Congressional committee desiring the 
public attention it could receive by focusing upon the perceived failures 
of auditors. However, by asking whether the public watchdog function 
of auditors was impaired, the committee suggested that auditors should 
serve this function. In suggesting that auditors had failed to provide 
advance warning of imminent corporate failures, the Committee implied 
that auditors had this responsibility. Further, in saying that auditors had 
"blessed" misleading accounting practices, the Committee claimed that 
auditors had failed to carry out the roles and responsibilities which the 
profession had defined for itself. The committee's allegations were thus 
doubly damning—not only had auditors failed to define their tasks 
properly but they had also failed to perform the work which they 
themselves had defined as appropriate. 
The Dingell hearings challenged the definitions of roles and 
responsibilities advanced by the profession. These hearings suggested 
that the issuance of an audit report implied broader responsibilities than 
those previously accepted and advocated by auditors. During the 1970s, 
auditors had maintained that audits were not specifically designed to 
detect fraud. Now, they were again criticized for failing to detect fraud 
and also for failing to provide an "early warning" of possible corporate 
failures. The media, in its coverage of the Dingell committee hearings 
and elsewhere, appeared to define an audit failure as the issuance of a 
"clean" audit report shortly followed by the declaration of corporate 
bankruptcy or the incidence of financial problems [Wall Street Journal, 
February 21, 1985; March 7, 1985]. This definition contained no 
reference to GAAS and implied that an audit failure could occur even 
when an auditor had followed such practices, a definition that conflicted 
with that provided by the auditors. 
Auditor Response. The auditors responded by attempting to defend 
their own definitions of the roles and purposes of an audit and to deny 
that the existing system was "broken." In testimony before the Dingell 
Committee, Philip Chenok, AICPA president, indicated that the 
incidence of audit failures was quite small relative to the large number 
of audits performed, claiming that of 50,000 audits performed since 
1979 only 123 might be called "audit failures" [Wall Street Journal, 
February 19, 1985]. In a later editorial, Chenok again stressed the 
relative infrequency of audit failures noting that "audit failures can and 
do occur but they are rare in relation to the tens of thousands of audits 
conducted each year. They result from human error by individual 
auditors. They do not reflect the overall quality of work in the 
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profession" [New York Times, March 17, 1985]. The small number of 
acknowledged audit failures was used to suggest that the current system 
was operating properly. 
The audit profession and others again argued that nonauditors had 
failed to understand the "proper" role of the auditor and the signficances 
that could be appropriately assigned to audit opinions. For example, 
Chenok [1986] noted that the Dingell hearings were concerned with 
whether auditors had effectively discharged their duties. He maintained 
that in order to answer this question one must understand the function of 
the independent audit—it was to report on the fairness with which 
financial statements presented corporate financial position [Chenok, 
1986]. The audit profession was to be judged on its own terms. 
As in the 1970s, auditors maintained that criticisms of the profession 
resulted from the public's failure to understand the "appropriate" role of 
the auditor and to accept the definition of this role as forwarded by 
auditors. From this perspective, an unqualified audit opinion was to be 
seen as providing reasonable assurance that financial statements 
conformed with generally accepted accounting principles rather than as 
providing evidence of a "clean bill of health." As such, an unqualified 
opinion might be appropriate for a company on the brink of financial 
collapse as long as the financial statements "reflect[ed] a fair and 
accurate picture of the company's financial condition" [New York Times, 
March 10, 1985].15 Furthermore, audits were not foolproof as the audit 
process relied upon a small sample of company transactions, many 
accounting matters were open to judgment [New York Times, March 10, 
1985; Chenok, 1986] and fraud was difficult to detect [Chenok, 1986]. 
Perhaps the following quote best summarizes the audit profession's 
position with regard to the controversy surrounding its work: 
A number of the questions raised in your proceedings [the 
Dingell Committee] and in our own studies of these matters are 
provoked by even more fundamental questions concerning 
auditor performance. These questions involve not how well the 
15However, if an entity was seen to be on the brink of collapse, the going 
concern assumption would be invalid and the use of historical cost accounting 
inappropriate according to generally accepted accounting principles. One 
wonders how many financial statements of companies that failed shortly after 
receiving an unqualified audit opinion were prepared using a basis of 
accounting other than historical cost. 23
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auditor has performed, but whether the auditor must undertake 
additional responsibilities to satisfy society's needs. Repeatedly 
it has been asserted that the public is seeking more from 
auditors in the area of protection from fraud and early warnings 
of business failure. In these respects, it would seem that there 
exists a gap between public expectations of the auditor's role 
and that which the auditor is, in fact, today performing. It is 
our belief that skepticism about the work of independent 
auditors has more to do with this mismatch. . . than it does with 
actual performance failures [cited in Miller, 1986, p. 34]. 
Again, the profession attempted to reframe concerns about its work as 
evidence of rising public expectations rather than as a controversy over 
the meanings to be assigned to audit reports and audit work and who 
would decide such meanings. Although concerns about the responsibility 
of auditors to detect fraud had arisen previously, the profession had not 
substantially altered its conception of its responsibilities or accepted an 
explicit responsibility to detect fraud or warn of imminent corporate 
collapses. It was still attempting to dominate definitions of its roles and 
responsibilities and to resist those forwarded by the Dingell committee 
and the press. Again, it formed a committee amidst the controversy. 
This committee was to "look at the current responsibilities of 
management, the auditors within and outside the company to detect 
fraud" [Wall Street Journal, February 12, 1985] and to develop methods 
to prevent and detect fraud among public and closely held companies 
[Wall Street Journal, February 19, 1985].16 The framing of the issue to 
be investigated by this panel suggested the answer desired by the 
AICPA. In particular, note the ordering of the individuals whose 
responsibilities were to be investigated: managers followed by internal 
auditors followed by external auditors. This ordering might be 
interpreted to reflect the profession's interest in maintaining that the 
detection of fraud was primarily management's responsibility. 
Congressional Intervention? Despite the arguments of the audit 
profession and SEC and the tentative actions taken by the audit 
profession, several Congresspersons introduced legislation to require 
16In announcing the formation of the panel, the AICPA denied that its 
formation was linked to the Dingell hearings that were due to begin on 
February 20, 1985: "We have been considering suggesting formation of this 
panel since last September, and we aren't doing this in reaction to the 
hearings" [Chenok in Wall Street Journal, February 12, 1985]. 24
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auditors to report to Government authorities suspicions of fraud or other 
illegalities noted during an audit [New York Times, May 23, 1986]. Rep. 
Wyden, a bill sponsor, indicated that "We've got to have an early 
warning system out there" [New York Times, May 23, 1986].17 Despite 
criticisms, the audit profession was still seen as a means to enhance the 
credibility of financial reporting. The bill did not propose replacing 
auditors with other experts. Instead, the responsibilities of the profession 
would be altered and expanded by this legislative action. The bill was 
of course, opposed by accounting firms as well as by the SEC and 
certain trade groups [Wall Street Journal, August 19, 1986]. 
In justifying this opposition, certain members of the profession 
expressed concerns that by requiring auditors to "blow the whistle" the 
relationship between the auditor and the client would be fundamentally 
altered [e.g., Wall Street Journal, June 20, 1986], "put[ting] us into an 
adversarial police-like role with corporations we currently service, and 
no one would benefit" [Wall Street Journal, May 23, 1986]. Auditors 
would become nothing more than "state-regulated examiners" when 
auditing "should be a private-sector activity, not an extension of the 
government's role" [Wall Street Journal, May 23, 1986]. Changing the 
role of independent auditors "to a police role" would detract from the 
primary responsibility of auditors—that of providing opinions as to 
whether corporate financial statements accurately reflect the "true" 
financial condition of a company [New York Times, May 23, 1986]. 
This proposed role for auditors would be "unworkable in relation to 
the auditor's principal objective of assessing the fair presentation of 
financial statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles . . ." [Miller, 1986]. The bill was seen as "unworkable" in 
part because it conflicted with the auditing profession's definition of its 
own roles and responsibilities. From its perspective, auditors were to 
assess whether financial statements fairly presented financial condition 
and performance, a task that did not require them to search actively for 
fraud even if it might result in material misstatements of financial 
condition and performance. These comments suggest the reluctance of 
auditors to alter their conception of their roles and responsibilities and 
a desire to dominate the definitions of tasks and responsibilities within 
their jurisdiction. 
17 Wyden later introduced a watered down version of the bill to require 
auditors to inform management about significant fraud and then to notify the 
SEC only if management failed to act properly upon such information within 
three months [Wall Street Journal, August 19, 1986]. 25
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Other prominent members of the auditing profession began to 
advocate altering professional responsibilities to include a responsibility 
for fraud detection. Change was seen as necessary in light of public 
expectations that auditors and the financial reporting system would warn 
the public of impending failures [Bertholdt, 1986]. Although the 
auditing profession was not described as failing to meet its public 
responsibilities, some believed it could no longer ignore the concerns 
raised by Congress, courts and the public. The expectations of the 
public were described as changed and so the roles and responsibilities of 
auditors and financial reporting should also ". . . be amended to provide 
the 'predictive' value the public now demands" [Connor, 1986, p. 77]. 
Perhaps, in these changed circumstances, auditors should accept 
responsibility to search for conditions that might lead to materially 
misstated financial statements and to reduce the risk that fraud would 
remain undetected [also see editorial by Connor in Wall Street Journal, 
December 3, 1985]. 
A limited role for the public in defining auditor's roles and 
responsibilities was also implied by the Treadway Commission report 
which recommended amending the auditor's opinion to indicate that 
auditors could provide reasonable but not absolute assurance that 
financial statements were free of fraud [New York Times, July 13, 
1987].18 This role was further recognized with the issuance of several 
new auditing standards in 1988 that were intended to improve auditor 
performance and communications, to address the concerns raised by the 
Treadway Commission report, and to narrow the expectations gap. 
Among other requirements, these standards enjoined auditors to be alert 
for illegal activities during the conduct of an audit, to design audit work 
to provide reasonable assurance of detecting material irregularities and 
errors, and to inform the board of directors of any such findings.19 These 
18 This report also recommended that all public companies be required to 
have audit committees and that auditors be evaluated by their peers. However, 
the report contained little evidence that audit committees, peer reviews, or an 
altered audit opinion would educe the incidence of fraudulent financial 
reporting. Indeed, pTL which was embroiled in financial scandal had an audit 
committee. However, the committee was composed of individuals with little 
experience, and they served primarily to rubber stamp the fraudulent activity 
of pTL officers such as Jim Bakker [Tidwell, 1993]. 
19Rep. Wyden criticized the new standards on the detection of fraud as he 
believed auditors needed to report suspicions of fraud to regulators ] Wall 
Street Journal, February 10, 1988]. 26
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standards implied that, in designing audits, auditors could no longer 
presume that management was honest and expressed more affirmatively 
the responsibilities of auditors relative to fraud [Carmichael, 1988]. The 
audit report was also revised in an effort to articulate more clearly the 
responsibilities of auditors to detect errors and irregularities. In 
particular, the following sentence was added to the report: "Those 
standards [GAAS] require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of 
material misstatements" [Roussey, et al., 1988, p. 45, emphasis added]. 
The new audit standards also required auditors to evaluate whether there 
was substantial doubt about a company's ability to continue as a "going 
concern" and to disclose such doubts.20 
Reactions to these standards by auditors included criticisms of the 
lack of clarity in detailing the extent of the auditor's responsibility to 
detect fraud [Neebes & Roost, 1987]. Others continued to advocate the 
"right" of the profession to define its own tasks and responsibilities. For 
example, Elliott and Jacobson [1987, p. 18] asked: 
Should CPAs judge proposed standards primarily by whether 
they do or do not conform to public expectations...A 
professional either has expertise and integrity that separates him 
[sic] from the public or he [sic] does not. . . That does not mean 
that public expectations are unimportant, only that they should 
not be the basic criterion used to evaluate proposed auditing 
standards. The appropriate criterion is whether and to what 
degree a proposal would improve the effectiveness of audits of 
financial statements. This responds to the public need the 
profession serves, not to supposed expectations. And needs and 
expectations can differ. (Emphasis in original) 
Although Elliot and Jacobson raised some valid criticisms of the 
proposed expectation gap standards in the remainder of their article, their 
basic opposition to the new accounting standards was premised upon 
disagreement over who should define the roles and responsibilities of 
auditors. For these authors, auditors should decide the nature and 
content of the tasks within their professional jurisdiction. In turn, the 
20A business bulletin that briefly described the proposal preceding this 
new requirement indicated that predictions of survivability were "a 
responsibility auditors have tried to duck until now" [Wall Street Journal, 
December 11, 1986]. 27
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public must rely upon (and trust) auditors to assess public needs rather 
than capitulate to unwarranted public expectations. Yet, the authors did 
not explicate how one could distinguish between a need and an 
expectation nor did they suggest any measure by which to evaluate the 
effectiveness of audits. Instead, they presumed that audits were essential 
to the economy and were capable of addressing the warranted concerns 
of the public by continuing on those terms previously established by 
auditors. In other words, the lay public was to have little role in defining 
this work or its expected outcomes. 
In contrast to the events of the 1970s, critical attention was not 
deflected from the auditing profession. As the media reported on new 
corporate failures, questions about the usefulness of audit opinions, and, 
in particular, questions regarding how financial results could turn sour 
so quickly after the issuance of a "clean" audit report continued to be 
raised. Alleged audit failures included Regina Co., Allegheny 
International Inc., Crazy Eddie Inc., Coated Sales Inc., and American 
Biomaterials Corp. [Wall Street Journal, January 24, 1989]. The ZZZZ 
Best Co. collapse was thought to provide the ". . . most vivid proof that 
the present system for independent auditors reporting financial fraud" did 
not work [Dingell in Wall Street Journal, January 22, 1988]. This 
collapse was particularly troubling as ZZZZ Best had fired one audit 
firm and hired another shortly before its financial collapse. Although the 
first audit firm communicated its suspicions of financial misdeeds to the 
SEC within the allotted time (30 days), this communication occurred 
after ZZZZ Best had filed for bankruptcy protection {Wall Street 
Journal, January 22, 1988; New York Times, January 27, 1988]. 
The audit profession was also heavily criticized in the press and by 
Congress, the General Accounting Office and others for its perceived 
failure to warn the public of the impending savings and loan crisis, a 
warning some claimed might have reduced the costs arising from the 
savings and loan bailout [see e.g., Wall Street Journal, November 23, 
1987; Jacob, 1991; Sternberg, 1992; "Big 6,"Business Week, 1992]. 
The quality of audits was criticized in almost every major savings and 
loan failure.21 For example, after the failure of Lincoln Savings and 
Loan, one regulator commented: "Lincoln is proof positive that any 
thrift in America could obtain a clean audit opinion despite being grossly 
insolvent" [Wall Street Journal, November 21, 1989] and allegations 
21Indeed, a GAO report [1989] alleged that auditors had in some instances 
failed to verify independently management assertions about the collectibility 
of loans and criticized the quality of several audits that it investigated. 28
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were also made that Lincoln's auditors had approved transactions that 
were "accounting-driven" in order to generate profits [Wall Street 
Journal, August 7, 1989; November 15, 1989]. Congress held many 
hearings to investigate these savings and loan failures, at which auditors 
were frequent witnesses. Audit firms were confronted with numerous 
lawsuits and paid significant settlements and fines in the aftermath of the 
savings and loan crisis [see e.g., Wall Street Journal, December 30, 
1988; January 24, 1989; January 27, 1989; March 2, 1990; February 6, 
1991; June 14, 1991; July 5, 1991; December 6, 1992]. 
In the midst of this controversy and scrutiny, Rep. Wyden continued 
to advocate legislation to require auditors to report to regulators the 
uncorrected illegal acts of audit clients and to promote legislation 
designed to establish an early warning system to prevent future financial 
debacles such as that which had occurred in the savings and loan 
industry [Wall Street Journal, Sept. 14, 1990, October 5, 1990, August 
2, 1991; September 3, 1991; July 29, 1992]. Various versions of this 
bill continued to be opposed by assorted business groups receiving on 
again but mostly off again support from the AICPA. This continued 
opposition occurred within the context of a self-described audit "liability 
crisis". Audit firms were reported to have expended hundreds of millions 
of dollars in fines, legal fees and settlements in the wake of the savings 
and loan crisis and as a consequence of securities fraud class action suits 
filed after a fluctuation in stock prices. One 1992 commentary estimated 
that accounting firms faced 4,000 liability suits (twice the number in 
1985) and that the largest firms were spending $30 million each year in 
legal fees [McCarroll, 1992]. Indeed, lawsuits resulted in the 
bankruptcy of one major U.S. auditing firm in 1990. 
Legal liability exposure was now described as the profession's top 
concern [see e.g., Sternberg, 1992; "Big 6", Business Week, 1992; 
O'Malley, 1993a,b; Lochner, 1993; Epstein, 1993; Fogarty et al., 1994] 
and it portrayed itself as a scapegoat for bureaucratic errors and investor 
desires to avoid losses ["Big 6", Business Week, 1992; O'Malley, 
1993a]. Members of the profession sought liability reform as litigation 
was increasing ". . . at a rapid rate . . . but that would not be so bad if 
only incompetent or dishonest auditors were penalized by huge 
judgments. However, few intelligent observers believe that this is the 
case" [Lochner, 1993, p. 94], as "unwarranted litigation and forced 
settlements constitute the vast majority of claims against accountants" 
[O'Malley, 1993b, p. 84]. In 1992, the Big 6 accounting firms joined a 
coalition of professional organizations and business, the Coalition to 
Eliminate Abusive Securities Suits, to lobby in favor of federal 
29
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legislation to curb "abusive lawsuits alleging securities fraud" [Wall 
Street Journal, September 1, 1992]. 
This rising incidence of litigation against auditors was interpreted as 
a search by the public for absolute assurance and as a threat to the 
ability of the financial reporting system to provide relevant, reliable and 
credible information. From this perspective, the audit opinion was to be 
interpreted neither as a "Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval" 
[McCarroll, 1992; Jacob, 1991] nor as suggesting that a particular 
company was a worthwhile or safe investment. Public expectations for 
audits were characterized as spiralling ever upward with regards to their 
ability to prevent fraud, mismanagement and business failure. Lochner 
[1993, p. 94] argued that "Far too much weight is being placed on 
accountants' work, in part because even some businessmen [sic] are 
ignorant of how audits are performed and what they represent. . . . audits 
cannot guarantee accuracy or the detection of fraud; they are not 
insurance policies." 
In this environment, auditors expressed concern as to whether 
legislation such as that proposed by Rep. Wyden would open the door 
for additional lawsuits against auditors—now by their clients 
[Silverstein, 1992; O'Malley, 1993a]. Further, some members of the 
profession began to characterize the necessity for liability reform as 
inseparable from auditors agreeing to undertake additional 
responsibilities [e.g., O'Malley, 1993a,b; Epstein, 1993]. This 
connection was made most explicitly by O'Malley [1993b, p.85] who 
argued that "any effort on the profession's part to meet these [public] 
expectations . . . always seems to generate newer and even more 
unrealistic expectations. . ." [O'Malley, 1993b, p. 85]. He also stated 
point-blank that "the accounting profession will not support any further 
legislative expansion of the independent auditor's responsibility without 
meaningful liability reform—for it is our view that increased obligations 
that create unreasonable expectations will almost certainly produce 
increased litigation" [O'Malley, 1993a, p. 7]. In other words, further 
participation by the public in defining the roles and responsibilities of 
auditors would carry a price—tort reform. 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
With the passage of the "Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
of 1995" [Public Law 104-67], the legal liability concerns of auditors 
were addressed. This new legislation enacted a system of proportionate 
liability under which auditors will pay damages based upon the share of 
30
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fraud for which they are held responsible. In exchange for this 
protection,22 the new law explicitly requires auditors to include 
"procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance of detecting illegal 
acts that would have a direct and material effect on the determination of 
financial statement amounts", "procedures designed to identity related 
party transactions . . . or otherwise require disclosure. . ." and "an 
evaluation of whether there is substantial doubt about the ability of the 
issuer to continue as a going concern during the ensuing fiscal year" 
[Public Law 104-67]. Furthermore, the law places a responsibility upon 
auditors to provide the SEC with a copy of their report of any illegal acts 
which have a material effect upon the financial statements when 
management fails to take "timely and appropriate remedial actions" and 
the Board of Directors has failed to inform the SEC of such a report 
within one business day after its receipt from the auditors [Public Law 
104-67]. Auditors, in exchange for liability reform, have accepted an 
affirmative duty to notify regulators of illegal acts in prescribed 
circumstances. Auditors must still implement the requirements of this 
legislation and the Auditing Standards Board of the AICPA has issued 
a proposal providing additional performance requirements to enable 
auditors to meet their fraud-detection responsibility [Wall Street 
Journal, April 4, 1996]. 
After decades of vociferous opposition to accepting responsibilities 
to detect fraud, such a responsibility has now been enacted into law. 
Throughout much of the period examined in this paper (and before), 
auditors sought to dominate the definitions of their roles and 
responsibilities and to equate the conduct of an audit with the production 
of credible financial reporting. Auditors were no doubt correct in 
asserting that an audit could not always be depended upon to detect 
frauds nor to warn infallibly of imminent business failures. However, in 
defining their roles and responsibilities, they argued that neither of these 
responsibilities were elements of their tasks (at least prior to the issuance 
of certain auditing standards in 1988). In part, the failure of auditors to 
"educate" the public as to the value of an audit that excluded such tasks 
from their jurisdictional domain arose from cultural values with which 
audits were aligned. The public refused to accept that despite credible 
financial reporting significant fraud could remained undetected and 
corporations could fail soon after a "clean" audit report was issued. 
22It was reported that proponents of the bill including the Big 6 auditing 
firms " . . . spent millions of dollars on a massive lobbying campaign 
[Wall Street Journal, June 29, 1995] for this legislation. 31
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Auditors had perhaps little choice in terms of the cultural values 
with which to align their work. While the profession benefited greatly 
from the Securities Acts, growing rapidly after their passage [McCraw, 
1984], it was in another sense limited by these acts. This New Deal 
legislation did not fundamentally alter either the securities industry or 
public policy with respect to it. Instead, the legislation seemed designed 
to restore confidence in the industry and to encourage broad-based stock 
ownership. The legislation adhered to the "belief that shareholders are 
'owners'" who could participate effectively in corporate governance 
through disclosure and proxy provisions [Merino & Neimark, 1982, p. 
39]23 Although shareholders were not expected to participate in the day-
to-day operations of corporate enterprises, they would receive 
information about the uses of funds, earnings, assets and liabilities of 
corporations. Required disclosures would provide the light". . . so that 
ownership may know what is being don with its property" [Andrews, 
1932, p. 354]. Auditors were closely linked to these purposes by the 
requirement in these acts for an "independent" check upon the 
representations of management and the profession was thereby connected 
to the provision of credible financial reporting. 
The emphasis upon disclosure and financial reports as a means to 
control management seemed to require a third party to verify these 
reports.24 This verification may be seen as an additional mechanism to 
suggest that measures had been taken to prevent management 
appropriation of stockholder property. Auditors were to be the 
intermediaries [Miranti, 1990] between the investing public, the claimed 
owners of the firm, and possibly avaricious and unscrupulous 
management. As a consequence, the administrators of the Securities 
Acts were also dependent upon auditors. This dependence perhaps 
partially explains why the profession was able to limit its responsibility 
throughout much of the period examined. While the value of "credible 
financial reporting" might be used to criticize and question the 
profession, it also limited the actions of government and closely linked 
the State, the SEC and the audit profession.25 No alternatives were posed 
23Also see Blough [1939], who referred to shareholders as owners of the 
enterprise, and Ripley [1927]. 
24My thanks to Barbara Merino for her comments which have been 
integrated in this paragraph. 
25See Galambos [1982] on the formation of such triocracies. 32
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to replace auditors as monitoring devices for private property. Instead, 
the emphasis was placed again and again upon either questioning the 
auditors or upon installing particular techniques to suggest their 
independence from management. The profession was criticized but never 
threatened with replacement or extinction. 
So we see the development and installation of new self-regulatory 
practices during the 1970s occurring amidst questions about the 
responsibility to detect fraud or warn of imminent corporate failures. 
Similar questions were raised during the 1980s amidst a myriad of 
corporate failures and frauds (perhaps particularly those in the savings 
and loan industry). Auditors were again constructed as failing to 
accomplish the work they had defined for themselves and were 
confronted with renewed demands to alter their previously self-defined 
tasks. Even then, the profession was successful in obtaining payment in 
the form of liability reform in exchange for ceding some control over the 
definition of its responsibilities. This paper suggests the difficulties of 
altering such responsibilities for an entrenched and well-organized 
profession even in instances where the definitions it forwards may starkly 
contrast with those anticipated or expected by the public. 
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